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Abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows multiple par-
ties to jointly compute the output of a function while preserv-
ing the privacy of any individual party’s inputs to that function.
As MPC protocols transition from research prototypes to real-
world applications, the usability of MPC-enabled applications
is increasingly critical to their successful deployment and
widespread adoption. Our Web-MPC platform, designed with
a focus on usability, has been deployed for privacy-preserving
data aggregation initiatives with the City of Boston and the
Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce. After building and
deploying an initial version of the platform, we conducted a
heuristic evaluation to identify usability improvements and
implemented corresponding application enhancements. How-
ever, it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of these changes
within the context of real-world deployments using traditional
web analytics tools without compromising the security guar-
antees of the platform. This work consists of two contributions
that address this challenge: (1) the Web-MPC platform has
been extended with the capability to collect web analytics
using existing MPC protocols, and (2) as a test of this feature
and a way to inform future work, this capability has been
leveraged to conduct a usability study comparing the two ver-
sions of Web-MPC. While many efforts have focused on ways
to enhance the usability of privacy-preserving technologies,
this study serves as a model for using a privacy-preserving
data-driven approach to evaluate and enhance the usability of
privacy-preserving websites and applications deployed in real-
world scenarios. Data collected in this study yields insights
into the relationship between usability and security; these can
help inform future implementations of MPC solutions.
Copyright is held by the author/owner. Permission to make digital or hard
copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
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1 Introduction
Companies, educational institutions, government agencies,
and other modern organizations have been collecting and an-
alyzing data pertaining to their internal operations for some
time with great effect to evaluate performance, to improve
efficiency, and to test hypotheses. While each organization’s
own data sets have internal value, combining data from multi-
ple organizations and analyzing it as a single corpus is likely
to provide even more value to the organizations themselves,
to policymakers, or to society at large. Unfortunately, each
organization’s internal data sets are often proprietary and con-
fidential, and their release may be potentially deleterious to
the organization’s interests. Organizations may be able to
release sensitive data selectively to specific agents entrusted
with its analysis. This is often costly, requires that the organi-
zations strongly trust the agent, and presents a security risk if
the data sets are improperly handled.
A cryptographic primitive called secure multi-party com-
putation (MPC) resolves this tension: aggregate data may be
computed and released while preserving the confidentiality of
each organization’s internal data. This has significant poten-
tial social benefits: MPC enables groups of organizations to
leverage collective data aggregation and analysis techniques
in contexts where data sharing is constrained or prevented by
legal and corporate policy restrictions.
As the focus of MPC research moves from the underlying
theory to the issues that affect real-world use cases, friendly
user interfaces and effective communication to non-expert
users is crucial for effective deployment. First, interactions
with users must build trust and create buy-in to the idea of
secure multi-party computation. Second, an effective user
interface is especially critical for MPC applications, as it is
computationally expensive (or impossible) to verify the cor-
rectness of a user’s inputs after they have been encrypted.
Input validation poses a problem for computations involving
many parties; one party’s incorrect input, whether submitted
maliciously or by mistake, could skew the results of the en-
tire computation. Multiple studies have shown that poorly
designed user interfaces hinder the success of security mea-
sures [45, 51]. A clearly designed and effective user interface
can both maximize the rate of participation and minimize the
chance of human errors leading to incorrect and misleading
results.
1.1 Our contributions
This paper examines the connections between usability and
cryptographically secure computing via MPC. We showcase
the importance of usability within secure computing, as well
as the value of secure computing in applications that calculate
usability metrics in a privacy-preserving manner. We detail
our experience designing and implementing a usable web-
based framework for secure computing, which we call Web-
MPC. We successfully deployed Web-MPC in two scenarios:
• Evaluating pay equity using the sensitive salary data of
166,705 employees from the city of Boston, MA (about
16% of the region’s workforce) [14, 15].
• Measuring the rate at which member organizations
within the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce sub-
contract work to minority-owned businesses [42].
Usability challenges of secure computing The design of
our framework is influenced by the interconnected usabil-
ity, security, and legal requirements of our two applications,
which we believe may be generalized to other scenarios. The
primary benefit of our framework over prior deployments of
MPC is an emphasis on the application’s usability to drive
participation within the target user community. CIOs, CTOs,
human resources personnel, and lawyers from key participat-
ing organizations (along with social scientists and members
of the city council that commissioned the studies) must all be
able to learn and comprehend both the application itself and
its underlying cryptographic properties.
We describe general usability challenges that MPC applica-
tions face in Section 3, and focus on usability challenges and
solutions specific to our application in Section 4. We evaluate
the effectiveness of our approach in Sections 5 and 8.
Employing secure computing to improve usability In the
second half of this work, we describe our implementation of
privacy-preserving web analytics on top of our existing Web-
MPC framework. This enables the analysis of user behavior
within the application without compromising any privacy
goals or guarantees, and demonstrates that it is possible to
measure and improve the usability of secure web applications
with no privacy cost.
We discuss the importance of privacy-preserving usability
data collection in Section 6, describe our implementation in
Section 7, and analyze the collected results in Section 8.
1.2 Related Work
Usability research within the broader field of security is
widespread. Countless “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt” papers
have established that unless encryption is so seamless that the
user cannot tell that they are encrypting, they will not bother
to do so [45, 51]. Usability studies and work to incentivize
use of secure platforms are common [21, 30, 46, 52]. How-
ever, these studies do not specifically tackle the difficulties in
adopting MPC for a broader audience, nor do they use MPC
to collect usability data.
Usability of MPC software There exist dozens of MPC
software frameworks [27] and several successful deployments
of MPC over the past decade [11, 13, 22]. These frameworks
span a wide range of design choices that have usability impli-
cations for both developers and data contributors:
• Proprietary [12,33] vs. open-source [2,10,17,24,28,36].
• Access to low-level cryptographic primitives [8,9,23,26]
vs. use of programming language abstractions like data
structures and formal type systems [7, 38, 44].
• Function specification in domain-specific languages [12,
44] vs. existing general-purpose programming languages
[7, 47, 50].
• Whether data contributors run web servers for commu-
nication or leverage a web-based service for improved
accessibility [29, 48].
Available frameworks also vary in software maturity, security
guarantees, and programming APIs. Despite the widespread
use of MPC, to our knowledge there has not yet been a public
usability study of any application that employs MPC.
Security and privacy of usability analytics Within the
cryptography community, previous work has been done to
create privacy-preserving web analytics, with some focus on
usability. However, these solutions have focused on using
differential privacy [3, 18, 43], which provides fundamentally
orthogonal (though compatible and complementary) privacy
and security guarantees when compared to MPC.
2 Application Context
Our Web-MPC application was initially developed to aid a
study through the Boston Women’s Workforce Council. It has
also been used for another initiative with the Greater Boston
Chamber of Commerce. The design and implementation of
Web-MPC was informed by nearly two years’ worth of discus-
sions with personnel (including CIOs, CTOs, HR executives,
and lawyers from key participation organizations), social sci-
entists, and members of the city council that commissioned
the original Boston Women’s Workforce Council study.
100% Talent Compact The Boston Women’s Workforce
Council (BWWC) is an initiative established in 2013 by
Mayor Thomas Menino’s office to measure and eliminate
gender-based pay gaps [19]. In order to assess the wage
gap, companies in the Greater Boston Area signed a com-
pact promising to contribute their highly sensitive wage data
across gender, race, and job categories. However, their effort
was stalled due to privacy concerns over the collection of sen-
sitive data. Employers were not willing to reveal their payrolls
to a “trusted” third party and, conversely, no employer was
willing to take on the role of a trusted third party due to the
risk of storing or leaking such sensitive data.
As a result, we built a platform using secure multi-party
computation to provide aggregate-level data statistics with-
out collecting any company’s individual data set. It has been
successfully deployed in 2015, 2016, and 2017 with results
and detailed analysis captured by reports through the Boston
Women’s Workforce Council. In the most recent 2017 de-
ployment, the system aggregated data from 114 companies,
representing 166,705 employees. This comprises over 16%
of the Greater Boston Area workforce and almost $15 billion
in collective annual compensation [20].
Since the application is used by HR professionals and other
employees who do not have a background in cryptography, it
is important for the user interface to be as intuitive as possi-
ble and to require no knowledge of the underpinning crypto-
graphic technologies. Our application interface resembles the
format of form EEO-1, which the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission requires companies to file annually.
By using the familiar EEO-1 format, we aimed to improve
the learnability and ease of use of our application, and to
minimize errors in data submission.
Pacesetters Initiative The Greater Boston Chamber of
Commerce (GBBC) launched the Pacesetters Initiative in
January 2018 [41]. This initiative aims to enhance economic
opportunities for minority-owned businesses by leveraging
the purchasing capacity of medium and large businesses in
the Greater Boston area [42]. A cohort of participating compa-
nies track and report metrics on their spending with Minority
Business Enterprises (MBE), contrasted with their general
spending across all subcontractors. The first data analysis
occurred in March 2018, with the second one following a
year later in February 2019. As a longitudinal study, the effort
allows the GBCC to validate what effect their initiative has
on equitable spending with MBEs. Given the data’s sensitive
nature, we partnered with the GBCC to use Web-MPC to
securely and privately compute aggregate results.
2.1 Roles
Generalizing from our two application scenarios, we consider
three types of roles in secure multi-party computation.
• An analyst (BWWC and GBCC in our settings) who
specifies the analytics, handles some of the computa-
tional burden of calculating it, and receives its output.
• Several contributors who permit their private data to
be used within the analytic’s calculation. The number
of contributors is unbounded and may be unknown in
advance. In both our settings, Boston-area employers
agreed to serve as contributors.
• An automated, publicly-accessible service provider that
connects all other participants without requiring them
to maintain servers or even to be online simultaneously,
and that handles most of the computational burden in cal-
culating the analytics. In our deployments, we (Boston
University) configured a web server to act in this role.
2.2 Selection of MPC Protocol
In general, MPC assures a contributor that the analyst and
service provider may only learn her data by pooling the infor-
mation they receive. We rely upon passive (i.e., semi-honest)
security, which informally states that if parties agree to ad-
here to the protocol and not collude together, then any passive
attempt to glean information along the way is futile [25]. The
service provider and analyst lack any clear incentive to fal-
sify the results of the aggregation or collude to learn private
input data. On the contrary, completing the data collection
successfully is directly beneficial to the BWWC and GBCC
(as the initiators of their respective initiatives) as well as to
us as the service provider (who is incentivized to maintain a
good reputation in order to deploy the application again in
the future). These security protections also extend to exter-
nal attackers who compromise the service provider. In more
detail, MPC guarantees that read attacks against the service
provider yield no private input data. Our implementation and
MPC protocol also guarantees that inputs cannot be linked
to the original contributor, parties that did or did not submit
cannot be identified, and that the number of users does not
need to be determined in advance.
We surveyed existing MPC implementations and their de-
signs at the beginning of our effort [32]. None of the existing
implementations at the time sufficed for our purposes. Some
of them required the analyst to configure a public-facing web
server, whereas others failed to provide the accessibility, asyn-
chrony, auditability, resubmission, or other usability require-
ments listed in Section 4.2.
Instead of using existing frameworks, we opted to create
a simple MPC protocol that was easy to implement without
errors, straightforward to explain to users who are not domain
experts, and adaptive enough to handle an a priori unknown
number of participants. The protocol uses a variant of additive
secret sharing in which random masks are added to each
company’s private inputs, as shown in Figure 1. The service
provider (Boston University) then computes the aggregate
sum of the masked inputs while the analyst (BWWC) receives
the masks. The analyst is then able to subtract the aggregate
of the masks from the aggregate of the masked values to get
the aggregate data. This protocol is detailed in Appendix C.
2.3 Application Versions
Our Web-MPC application has gone through multiple itera-
tions over time. There are two versions we will consider in
our discussions, and we will refer to them as V1 and V2. V1
refers to first iteration of the application that uses additive
secret sharing. The V1 data submission page is displayed
in Figure 4. V2 refers to the current iteration of the applica-
tion, after changes were made to the user interface based on
the heuristics evaluation detailed in Section 5.1. Instead of
additive secret sharing, V2 uses Shamir’s Secret Sharing to
support richer analysis (as discussed in Section 4.1). The most
recent version also enables the creation of smaller participant
subsets, called cohorts, within a session. For the 100% Talent
Compact, these cohorts will consist of companies grouped by
industry; the Pacesetters Initiative divides participants into
cohorts based on prior participation. Aspects of the V2 user
interface are captured in Figures 6, 8, 7, and 9. The differ-
ences between the V1 and V2 iterations of the platform are
discussed in greater detail in Appendix B.
2.4 Deployment
The protocol and software application described in this section
were deployed successfully by the BWWC [6, 35] and by the
GBCC. We split each deployment into two phases: (1) a dry
run on innocuous data and (2) a live analysis over sensitive
data during which our team remained on-call to ensure any
potential technical issues or usage questions were addressed.
Training Sessions The application’s learnability, familiar-
ity, and ease of use are critical to minimizing user error and
to achieving a successful secure deployment. To preserve pri-
vacy, we could not help participants enter data into the user
interface or allow them to ask us questions dependent on their
data during actual deployments. This concerned us: we felt
that we only had one chance to introduce MPC to participants.
If even one participant entered erroneous data and the out-
put was unsatisfactory, they might blame the technology (and
switch to something less secure or not participate at all). To
reduce this risk, we conducted dry runs involving fictitious
data (provided to participants) in which they could ask us
questions, and become familiar with the application interface
and submission flow.
A dry run of the deployment served the purpose of famil-
iarizing participants with the protocol, process, interface and
requirements. We distributed an Excel spreadsheet that exactly
matched the browser data entry interface, and ensured interop-
erability between the two. Contributors could use this spread-
sheet to prepare their data and to verify that their browser
allowed them to copy and paste data directly into the web
application. The entire workflow was demonstrated via a live
WebEx session that all participants could join. We initiated a
mock collection, shared the session key, and encouraged all
contributors to submit random data. This WebEx session was
recorded, uploaded to YouTube, and shared with all partici-
pants so they could review it at their own pace. The training
sessions provided the contributors with opportunities to ask
questions, and allowed us to discover technical issues con-
tributors might encounter (e.g., using an outdated browser)
without the risk of leaking information about their inputs.
Live Deployments In both deployments, the analyst was
able to perform MPC jointly with our server to privately com-
pute the aggregate across all contributing parties, and to delete
their private key (in effect erasing the input data).
2.5 Mechanical Turk Usability Study
Prior to recent deployments, we conducted a usability study
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) Platform to evalu-
ate the success of different iterations of our application. We
utilized MTurk users, rather than data contributors involved in
either the BWWC or the Pacesetters deployments, in order to
obtain data from a larger audience that is not already familiar
with versions of the interface. Current data contributors have
either already seen previous iterations of the platform or have
received training during which they had the opportunity to
ask questions. By using MTurk, we could assess whether our
tool is usable with limited instructions and no prior training.
During the study, MTurk users used our application to submit
data before completing a System Usability Scale (SUS) ques-
tionnaire [16]. MTurks users were split into three groups. The
first interacted with V1; the second and third interacted with
V2, but were asked to enter data manually or via a spreadsheet.
We describe the SUS and its results in Section 5.2. Addition-
ally, during this study we collected usability data securely via
MPC in the background as a proof of concept.
3 Usability Challenges in Deploying MPC
MPC introduces unique usability challenges. Target users are
not domain experts and are unfamiliar with this technology;
their willingness to use an application depends on their confi-
dence that MPC protects their sensitive data and guarantees
compliance with data sharing requirements. Also, the inher-
ent privacy-preserving properties of MPC make it difficult
or impossible to identify spurious or erroneous contributions
that might compromise the overall analysis. Thus, the applica-
tion’s learnability, familiarity, and ease of use are also critical
to minimize errors.
3.1 Inspiring Trust in MPC
Unlike more popular cryptographic primitives (e.g., end-to-
end encryption), MPC is not yet ubiquitously used in practice.
MPC’s guarantees and terminology are not widely circulated
within non-technical or semi-technical contexts. As a result,
HR personel, lawyers, CEOs, and end users are less likely to
be aware of MPC guarantees or to have high confidence in it.
This puts an additional burden on MPC application designers
to communicate the guarantees of MPC to the relevant stake-
holders and inspire confidence in its security.
This cannot be achieved solely by relying on mathematical
and cryptographic proofs. Such proofs are not accessible to
the wider population. Furthermore, they may not be convinc-
ing to someone that does understand what a proof entails. In
our experience, analogies, examples, and concrete demonstra-
tions of MPC play a large role in this endeavor.
Some contributors still require that the various compute par-
ties within an MPC application sign a non-disclosure agree-
ment governing data submitted by the contributors. This can
be attributed to a lack of understanding or confidence in MPC
guarantees, as well as familiarity with NDAs and their use to
mitigate liability. However, due to the way that MPC works,
we believe participants would benefit more from the creation
of a different legal construct: a “non-collusion agreement”
with enforceable civil penalties.
3.2 Correctness and Participation Trade-offs
When building usable MPC platforms, designers must ne-
gotiate an inherent trade-off between the participation rate,
the correctness of the aggregate output data, and the secu-
rity of the input data. With an increase in contributors, the
chance that at least one contributor provides incorrect data
increases; in other words, increased participation adversely
impacts correctness. Simultaneously, participants are more
likely to participate if they have confidence that the computa-
tion will be correct (and, thus, useful).
Error Sensitivity Unlike traditional computation plat-
forms, the nature of dealing with private inputs under MPC
makes error recovery tedious (if not impossible). MPC does
not allow any single party to look at input data, or to analyze it
manually. This makes it difficult to detect and correct invalid
input data and to remove outliers. It is also difficult to use
contributor-specific context that could normally inform an
analyst of potentially incorrect data. For example, a publicly
traded multinational company that submits an input indicat-
ing it employs only five individuals is likely to represent a
mistake, but this cannot be determined easily without see-
ing the individual inputs. Detection and correction logic can
be encoded to run under MPC. However, this increases per-
formance overhead and may require that all such logic be
formalized and written down without prior knowledge of the
input data’s characteristics.
All these issues make it critical for the application to detect
errors before contributors submit erroneous data and taint
the aggregate results. This, in turn, necessitates that the ap-
plication be easy to use and to learn, and that it allows con-
tributors to review, correct and resubmit any erroneous data.
Contributors cannot contact application maintainers during
deployment, as this may inadvertently reveal information (for
example, certain errors may only occur when the input meets
certain conditions). We attempt to increase the contributors’
familiarity with the application and to decrease their need for
support during its deployment by holding training sessions
(as described in Section 2.4).
Benefits of Participation We also note that output privacy
(informally speaking) increases with the number of contrib-
utors, as the output is an aggregate of the inputs (e.g., in the
pathological case of a single contributor providing input, that
input is necessarily leaked by the output). Thus, the simplicity
and accessibility of the framework, as well as the compre-
hensibility of the underlying cryptographic tools indirectly
contribute to the overall security of the protocol by encourag-
ing participation.
4 Usability Challenges within our Use Cases
Our application requirements and deployment scenario posed
specific usability challenges, in addition to the general us-
ability challenges described in Section 3. We describe our
solutions to these challenges throughout this section.
4.1 Communicating MPC
In order to convey MPC’s security guarantees to non-experts,
we devised various analogies for additive secret sharing that
constitute a possible workflow they can replicate on their
own. While our evidence is purely anecdotal, we surmised
that some explanations worked better than others. In an early
example, we attempted to demonstrate the process of splitting
values into shares, which was visually represented by dividing
bars into smaller bars and then reassembling them with the
pieces of others. This limited us to using only positive values
(negative space is difficult to represent), and in turn falsely
gave some participants the impression that we would leak the
lower bound of their data. In another example, and partly as
a response to the lower bound question, we used clocks with
the summation of a random value to explain the concept of
finite fields or modulo. This in turn raised questions about
the process of joining multiple clocks together, and how the
actual data would not get lost in the process.
One analogy that did appear to resonates with our target
audiences, and could be explained outside of a presentation, is
describing the process as lying about your salary to one party,
and letting another party know by how much you lied (i.e.,
an offset); neither number reveals your actual salary to either
party. But if multiple contributors give their lies and offsets
to the two parties, each party can tally what they have (either
lies or offsets) and then subtract one sum from the other to
obtain a total of the original values.
The analogies are not meant to explain intricate details of
MPC, but to give the audience confidence that it is possible
to compute a function without revealing private inputs to
those performing the computation. We estimate that about
500 people viewed our presentations, with attendees present at
training sessions, conference talks, academic events, corporate
conference calls, and other venues. While we cannot claim to
know the total number of people whose minds were changed
as the direct result of our presentations, both (1) personal
feedback after the sessions and (2) a marked uptick in BWWC
Compact Signers who indicated their willingness to contribute
data indicate the effectiveness of our communication efforts.
We accompany our explanations with a diagram of our
protocol that includes the public-key cryptography required
to allow one enabling party to handle all communications.
Figure 1 accurately reflects the MPC protocol used in the first
iteration of the platform, as additive secret sharing met the
basic analytic needs (i.e., averages) and was straightforward to
explain. Our implementation was open-source and available
for anyone to audit. In later deployments, analysts specified
more complex analytics (e.g., deviations and longitudinal
analysis of specific cohorts) that required a general-purpose
MPC library that relies on Shamir’s Secret Sharing [49].
Shamir’s Secret Sharing is more complex than the additive
secret sharing scheme described initially (e.g., it relies on
properties of polynomials over a finite field). We found that
non-experienced personnel were willing to have more con-
fidence in this scheme after being exposed and familiarized
with simpler variants like additive secret sharing. They were
more receptive to the idea that any function can be computed
on private data once they understood how some functions
could be computed. This appreciation increased the willing-
ness of several participants to contribute sensitive data despite
an initial unwillingness to do so.
4.2 Usability Requirements
Our application scenarios involve individuals with a wide
range of technical backgrounds utilizing computing resources
that are outside our control and governed by a variety of orga-
nizational constraints. Thus, application usability is critical.
For a starting point grounded in the literature, we referred
to the five usability components defined in seminal work by
Jakob Nielsen and other human factors practitioners [39].
However, we found that these five components were insuf-
ficient to fully and faithfully characterize our usability re-
quirements. This is due to the distinct usability challenges
associated with deploying MPC both in general and in our
specific application. Instead, we present a novel categoriza-
tion of usability requirements that we believe is more suitable
to our MPC application. Where possible, we indicate how our
category relates to those defined by Nielsen. We recognize
that our requirements may not be well-suited for evaluating
the usability of privacy-preserving software in general; that is
a broader issue outside of the scope of this paper.
Error Minimization Errors are particularly problematic in
our setting, as MPC’s encoding of data prevents us from de-
tecting or sanitizing bad inputs. In addition to allowing users
to copy and paste the data (rather than use a more error-prone
manual entry process), we proactively provide feedback to
warn users about missing or spurious (e.g., out of range) data
prior to submission (see Figures 4 and 8). We also compel
users to consciously confirm that their submissions do not
have errors by requiring that they click a checkbox before
submission attesting to this fact. Additionally, we permit con-
tributors to resubmit their data if they discover that a previous
submission was corrupted due to human error or software
failure. In general, supporting re-submission influences the
design of the underlying MPC protocols, since not all MPC
protocols can support it without modification.
Asynchronous Participation In traditional usability, this
can be viewed as a component of subjective satisfaction as de-
fined by Neilsen. However, it is particularly important for our
MPC application. We used software support for asynchronous
participation in order to satisfy the logistical challenge of
scheduling a data analysis effort that involves numerous en-
terprises of various sizes. This requirement has significant
implications when employing MPC because it dictates which
MPC protocols can be used. In fact, this requirement was a
factor in our decision to design a new MPC software frame-
work. When using our software, contributors only need to be
online while entering their data, and the analyst only needs
to be online at two points in the protocol: to start the pro-
cess and to compute the analytic. The analyst additionally
needs to store and safeguard one piece of information (an
RSA private key) between these two points in time. Finally,
the analyst has the ability to see how many submissions have
taken place on their interface; this feedback reassures them
that the application is being used successfully by contributors.
Ease of Use This umbrella component includes the learn-
ability, efficiency of use, and memorability requirements as
defined by Neilsen. These requirements have significance
in MPC use cases only in that addressing them can reduce
submission errors; their significance otherwise is primarily
determined by their importance in informing the design of
any data entry system. Our application meets these require-
ments: it relies on familiar web interfaces, and requires (on
the part of the contributor and of the analyst) no setup process,
Figure 1: Slide detailing the MPC protocol. This was used in explanations to HR employees, lawyers, CEOs, and so on.
no specialized software or hardware, and no management of
public internet addresses. Additionally, we provide users with
an Excel spreadsheet to complete ahead of time; this sheet
requires the same information as the web application, in the
same format. Users can simply copy and paste the informa-
tion from one source to another, or import the spreadsheet
directly into our interface. Even when the UI is improved,
the spreadsheet template and design remain fixed between
deployments, improving the memorability of our system (es-
pecially because companies use it to recurringly provide their
salary data).
Comprehension and Trust MPC technology can be diffi-
cult to explain to non-experts. It is critical to ensure contrib-
utors understand and trust the security guarantees of MPC,
as this can increase the rate of participation. This challenge
is unique to privacy preserving technologies as described in
Section 3.1, and is not emphasized in Neilsen’s requirements.
Section 4.1 describes our approach: we initially chose a pro-
tocol that is easier to explain, accompanied by analogies and
visualizations to improve comprehensibility for non-experts.
Finally, our implementation is open-source to inspire trust.
4.3 Workflow Design
Given that the purpose of this application is to allow a group of
non-domain expert participants to execute a session of a secret
sharing scheme, we had to make several design choices that
increase the usability of the system without compromising its
security.
Experience of Contributors The application automates al-
most all portions of the protocol. The analyst must distribute
the session identifier and participation codes to the partic-
ipants (e.g., via email). This ensures that the participants’
experience is simple and error-resilient: they can simply click
on a link (without entering participation codes or long identi-
fiers manually). Because the analyst sends these links via an
external channel, the service provider cannot see any correla-
tion between participation codes and individual contributors.
The service provider does not allow the analyst to see which
participation codes were used to submit and which were not;
only a count of contributions and their submission times are
shown.
Participants must enter data either through manual entry
or by pre-populating a formatted spreadsheet that has been
provided to them and importing the file into their web browser.
Since realistic scenarios involve not one but a collection or
table of labeled numeric quantities from each participant,
the software application actually implements the protocol in
parallel on multiple labeled fields within a table.
Experience of Analysts The analyst starts a session by
clicking a single button in the analyst interface and saving
the 2048-bit private RSA key (unique to that session) to their
hard drive. This interface also enables the creation of cohorts
and the generation of participation links for contributors. Fi-
nally, it includes a session tracker that displays an anonymous
participant submission history, as depicted in Figure 6. Their
second interface, the final unmasking page, computes the final
aggregate data upon successful submission of the analyst’s
private RSA key associated with the session.
Due to the role of the analyst in our system, the usability of
their interface is not as critical as the usability of the contribu-
tors’ interface. This is partly due to the fact that the analyst
does not provide numerical inputs, and thus is not responsible
for any error-prone input tasks that can affect the quality of
the computation. Additionally, analysts had constant interac-
tions with us as we developed the application, and thus have
more experience navigating and using it.
If too few participants have submitted their data (the mini-
mum number of participants can be configured) the service
provider will not allow the analyst to compute the final aggre-
gate data. Once the final aggregate is computed, it is displayed
in the same familiar table format as the input table presented
to individual participants.1
5 Usability Evaluation
We conducted two kinds of common usability evaluations, a
Heuristics Evaluation and a System Usability Scale (SUS).
We used both to evaluate our application’s flow and inter-
face. The results of the Heuristics Evaluation informed the
subsequent redesign of our V1 interface into the V2 version.
We discuss these evaluations and their results throughout this
section.
Figure 4 illustrates the original web interface (prior to
changes made based on the heuristics study) used for the
BWWC study2 as it appears within a web browser to each con-
tributor. The participant interface provides a familiar spread-
sheet table that an end-user can fill with data either manually
or by pasting the data from another application. The email
address is hashed on the client-side and this hashed value is
used only as an index into the server database, allowing each
participant to submit more than once in a session (overwriting
their previous submissions).3
5.1 Heuristics Evaluation
After deploying our web application twice for the BWWC,
a heuristic evaluation was conducted on V1 (displayed in
Figure 4) to serve as an iterative design tool for addressing
usability concerns. Heuristic evaluations involve having a
set of evaluators examine the web application to judge its
compliance with recognized usability principles (known as
“heuristics”). More information can be found in Appendix A.
1It is the responsibility of the analyst to destroy their local copy of the
private key after retrieving the result if this is the agreed-upon procedure.
That is: assuming secure erasures, we achieve forward secrecy when the
protocol is composed.
2The client application can be viewed at https://100talent.org.
3After submission, data remains visible in cleartext in the participant’s
browser so that any errors can be identified and a fixed set of inputs can
be resubmitted. We relied upon briefings to inform participants about the
post-submission encryption process.
Results A total of 32 issues were identified. Each issue,
along with its categorization and average severity rating, are
shown in Tables 4 and 5. Two issues ("There is no indication
as to whether the email address is valid" and "There is no
email confirmation indicating that data was submitted") di-
rectly highlight the trade-offs between usability, correctness,
and security discussed in Section 4.2. The security require-
ments preclude any server-side validation of the identity of
a data contributor (because we impose the requirement that
no individual participant can be identified by any part of the
application) or any communications from the server to the
client via another channel that requires their identity (such as
email messages). At the same time, an error rate of zero is re-
quired, since any data entry errors lead to incorrect aggregate
results. Thus, it is still necessary to allow users to resubmit
data if they notice they made a mistake. The compromise
was to create a unique identifier corresponding to the clients’
submission.
Ten issues (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 6.2
in Table 4) are difficult to correct because the layout and for-
mat of the web application is based on the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) Employer Information
Report EEO-1 [1], which large-employer organizations are
required to complete and file annually. Changing the web
application to address these ten issues would lead to a mis-
match with the EEOC Report, potentially confusing users and
reducing memorability.
Some issues (1.5, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 6.1, and 6.2) were ad-
dressed during in-person training and/or within training mate-
rials . Other issues were deemed out of scope for this project
(3.1, 7.1), or no longer relevant with the introduction of new
workflows.
Interface Redesign We used feedback from the heuristics
evaluation to redesign our application’s data submission in-
terface prior to the 2017 deployment. The redesign divided
the application into four distinct steps, each visually and logi-
cally separated by a card layout that clearly delineates varying
steps in the submission process, and addressed the remain-
ing issues from the evaluation. More details can be found in
Appendix B.
5.2 System Usability Scale
Prior to our recent deployments, we conducted a usability
study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) Platform. The
users were all directed to the Pacesetters Initiative data col-
lection platform and asked to fill in the nine data fields with
numerical data. Afterwards, users completed the System Us-
ability Scale (SUS) questionnaire [16], comprised of 10 ques-
tions evaluating the application. Using the SUS allows us to
measure our application’s perceived usability with a relatively
small sample size. It is also advantageous because it is quick
for the participants to complete.
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Figure 2: Histograms of SUS results, binned with width 10 on the x-axes and number of respondents on the y-axes.
Study Methodology To successfully submit data on the
web page, users were required to:
1. Load the page
2. Fill out the nine fields of the form with numerical values
of their choosing (either manually or by uploading a
spreadsheet, depending on the experimental group)
3. Check a box to indicate the submission is correct
4. Correct any errors indicated by the user interface after
the verification box is checked
5. Press the button labeled “Submit”
Unlike participants for the BWWC and GBCC initiatives,
Mechanical Turk participants did not receive any prior train-
ing on the platform or an explanation of MPC.
Experimental groups Data sets were collected from three
experimental groups:
• Group 1: Users who interacted with V1 of the web page;
V1 has the original appearance and interface of the plat-
form as first deployed in 2015, configured with the data
fields from the Pacesetters initiative as displayed in Fig-
ure 5. The users had to manually enter data into each of
the cells as there was no import option.
• Group 2: Users who interacted with the current design,
V2, of the web page. These users were instructed to
manually enter data into each of the cells. The drag-and-
drop import box, as depicted in Figure 7, was removed
to avoid confusion.
• Group 3: Users who interacted with the current design,
V2, of the web page, and were asked to fill out a spread-
sheet on their local machine and upload it to the page
via either the drag-and-drop or the file import feature.
For each group, 50 participants were recruited on the Ama-
zon Turk Platform. Participants were paid $2.50 for complet-
ing the task, which at the beginning of the study was estimated
to take 10 minutes. Previous studies have noted demographic
differences between MTurk workers and the general popula-
tion [34], specifically that MTurk workers tend to be younger
and have lower incomes than the general population. Users are
likely more familiar with common website interfaces, which
may skew the SUS scores collected slightly higher than they
might be for users of the BWWC and GBCC applications.
Results The results of the SUS Survey are intended to be a
general indicator of a system’s usability, rather than a diag-
nostic of specific system successes or failures. Histograms
of the SUS scores by group are displayed in Figure 2. The
mean and median SUS scores are displayed in Table 1. Group
1 scored highest, and all scores were above average compared
to an analysis by Bangor et al. in 2009, which reports a mean
SUS score of 68.2 for the over 3400 web pages surveyed [5].
However, one might speculate this comparison to Bangor et
al. is limited due to improvements in web technology and
design standards, as well as increased familiarity with web
interfaces among the general population.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Mean 80.4 78.3 76.9
Median 85.00 83.75 82.50
Table 1: The mean and median of SUS scores for each experi-
mental group.
In order to determine if there was a significant difference
between the SUS scores per group, a Kruskal-Wallis one-way
analysis of variance was performed on the SUS scores in each
group [31]. The resulting p-value of 0.474 is not sufficient
to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference. Thus,
although more recent user interfaces that we tested (Groups
2 and 3) scored slightly lower on the SUS scale, the scores
do not indicate a statistically significant decrease in overall
usability.
6 MPC for Improving Usability
Collecting user data on websites is an accepted best practice
for understanding and improving their design and usability.
Web analytics platforms such as Google Analytics and Mix-
panel provide valuable feedback on application usage and
facilitate data driven methods for improving usability fea-
tures, accessibility, and design efficacy. These platforms are
compatible with almost all web pages and provide valuable
usage data, but also collect a multitude of identifying factors
about users that expose information to both the site adminis-
trator and third-party platform providers [4]. While collecting
information about how people interact with an application is
helpful for interface enhancements, it is naturally at odds with
the goals of an application designed to protect user privacy.
Our goal was to introduce a collection method for web
usability metrics and usage data that did not compromise the
privacy goals of the original application. Previous deploy-
ments of Web-MPC lacked a method to analyze how users
are interacting with the application, as we believed collecting
this data could undermine the privacy of the users and their
trust in the system.
7 Collection of Usability Data via MPC
Secure web analytics data collection via MPC was integrated
into the implementation of Web-MPC. Client-side analytics
were collected through the existing MPC protocol, meaning
that no new cryptographic protocols or libraries were required
to collect and analyze the data. The usability data sets were
masked in the same manner as the application data (salary
data for BWWC and spending data for GBCC). The masked
values are also sent to the service provider while the masks
were encrypted and sent to the analyst. The metrics are re-
vealed in aggregate form to the analyst in the same way as
the application data sets that are contributed, meaning that
no piece of information can be tied to a specific user. No
modifications were made to the submission workflow itself
or the underlying protocol detailed in Appendix C.
7.1 Usability Metrics
The following metrics were measured on the client side and
submitted via MPC. Metrics are captured either on entry time
(when a user completes a field) or on submission (when a user
clicks the submit button); all metrics are only communicated
to the server upon successful submission.
Time spent measures the number of milliseconds a user spends
on various areas of the user interface. It is captured for each
card of the layout: session area (cf. Fig. 7, table area (cf. Fig.
8, submission area (cf. Fig. 9). In the current UI, time spent
is also tracked for the entire table area and the review area.
Data Prefill is a metric that measures if a user filled out
the data using a spreadsheet and then submitted it by either
importing or dragging and dropping the spreadsheet.
Validation errors refer to any error encountered by the partici-
pant while interacting with the user interface as enumerated
below.
• Session info error occurs when a user enters an invalid
session key or participation code.
• Empty cell error refers to any occurrence in which the
user leaves a table cell empty during manual entry.
• Invalid cell error refers to any occurrence in which the
user does not enter integers into the table cell during
manual entry.
• Submission cell error measures whether there are any
remaining empty cell or invalid cell errors when a user
clicks the submit button. It does not count the number
of errors remaining. This metric increments by 1 each
time a user attempts to submit with remaining errors.
• Unchecked error occurs when a user attempts to sub-
mit data without first verifying that they have double-
checked the values they have entered.
• Server error is captured if a user attempts to submit
but is unsuccessful and encounters a status of 0 or 500,
indicating a server-side error.
• Generic submission error is captured if a participant
attempts to submit but is unsuccessful and receives a
status of anything other than 200, 0, or 500.
8 Results and Analysis
The usability study ran over a three-day period and had 150
participants from Mechanical Turk. Of those 150 participants,
143 were able to successfully submit data with a total num-
ber of 200 submissions made (including re-submissions). Al-
though 7 participants did not successfully submit data, all 150
participants completed the SUS survey (discussed in Section
5.2).
We emphasize that the results and success of the user study
serve as a proof-of-concept for MPC-enabled web-analytics
collection, and demonstrates the general feasibility of MPC
as a tool to inform and improve application usability.
8.1 Usability Metrics Results
The usability metrics collected during use of the application
are presented in Table 3, which contains the breakdown of
errors encountered by users, and Figure 3, which presents the
average time spent on the page by the different user groups.
Group # Participants # Submissions # Re-Submissions
1 50 72 22
2 49 69 20
3 44 59 15
Table 2: Total number of successful participants and submis-
sions by group.
Validation Error Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Empty cell 0.56 (28) 0.20 (10) 0.07 (3)
Invalid cell 0.04 (2) 0.02 (1) 0.00 (0)
Submission cell 0.08 (4) 0.16 (8) 0.05 (2)
Unchecked 0.02 (1) 0.04 (2) 0.00 (0)
Session info 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
Server 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
Generic submission 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
Table 3: Average errors per user for each experimental group.
The number of participants was 50, 49, 44 for Groups 1, 2, 3,
respectively. The absolute number of total errors encountered
by group is listed in the parenthesis.
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Figure 3: Average time spent per participant in seconds on
the individual data entry tables by group.
8.2 Analysis
First, the results of the study confirm the feasibility of using
MPC to understand and improve application usability. This
could be achieved by introducing an MPC library to an ex-
isting web application in order to collect data in a privacy
preserving way, or, more reasonably, by adding usability data
analysis features to applications that already employ MPC.
With regard to Web-MPC, the results of the study suggest
that the usability enhancements made to the application led to
fewer data entry errors, even though some participants experi-
enced difficulties with importing pre-filled spreadsheets. Only
21 of the 50 participants in this cohort chose to upload their
pre-filled spreadsheets, which may account for the lower SUS
results. It is expected that there would be fewer submission
cell errors for Group 3, as their data would have been already
filled out ahead of time. This should reduce the number of
errors due to an empty cell or an invalid cell, as well. Even
though only 21 participants imported spreadsheet files, there
were only 2 total submission cell errors; this implies that
fewer users encountered difficulties at submission time.
Although participants in Group 1 had a slightly higher SUS
score, they encountered more errors in almost all categories
compared to both Group 2 and Group 3. The version of the
interface they used highlighted cells with errors in red but did
not have tooltips explaining what the error was, which may
have made it more difficult for participants to understand how
to fix their errors. As shown in Figure 8, the V2 submission
page provides additional instructions for participants com-
pared to the V1 page. The additional instructions explaining
what red and yellow cells indicate may have assisted these
users in fixing their errors and could have prevented them
from making the same mistake in subsequent cells.
8.3 Limitations
A key limitation of the process for gathering usability metrics
is that information is only collected upon submission, when
the secret sharing scheme is initiated. Thus, we cannot obtain
metrics from participants who may have had too much trouble
with the platform to successfully submit any data. In Group
1, all 50 participants successfully submitted data and metrics
were captured for all of them. For Group 3, 6 participants
were unable to complete the data submission process. Their
contributions were therefore omitted from the final aggregate
results. To account for this, the SUS survey was completed
by all participants regardless of their ability to successfully
contribute data.
Another limitation is that we are not able to link usability
metrics back to individual users (as per the security guarantees
of the MPC protocol). While this ensures user privacy, it limits
the ability to gauge variance between the results. It is possible
that all errors are produced by a single outlier participant in
each group.
For each of the experimental groups, there were multiple
resubmissions of data. Each time a re-submission occurs,
the data corresponding to the participant is overwritten. This
includes all of the data capturing the participant’s submission
errors and usage data. Thus, we only have the usability metrics
from each participant’s most recent submission, omitting their
initial behavior with the platform. This may understate the
number of errors encountered because we cannot analyze
client-side usability metrics from previous data submissions.
As empty and invalid cell errors are captured upon manual
entry, the results for Group 3 emerge either from participants
who manually submitted or from those who attempted to fix
cells, adding errors after importing a spreadsheet.
9 Future Work
The integration of usability metrics into a MPC protocol al-
lows us to inform ongoing iterations of the user interface de-
sign using data from both usability studies and real-world de-
ployments. We plan to collect usability data from participants
in future deployments of the application with the BWWC and
the GBCC. We also plan to continue expanding the number
of usability metrics we collect.
As previously discussed, client-side usability metrics are
only secret-shared upon successful data submission. We
would like to gather usability data from all submission at-
tempts. This method for gathering usability metrics has helped
us mitigate the tension between the need to gather data on
user behavior and the need to ensure the privacy of user ac-
tivity and inputs. We intend to generalize this solution into a
standalone plugin that can be used to allow other web services
to obtain web analytics in a privacy-preserving way.
10 Lessons Learned
In order for privacy-preserving applications to be deployed
and used to analyze sensitive data, the relevant stakeholders
need to be convinced of the privacy guarantees of the under-
lying protocols while being insulated from the nuances of
their implementation. Although there are a broad array of
MPC protocols available, our initial use of additive secret
sharing enabled relatively straightforward explanations of
MPC. Demonstrating how MPC works using a simple, con-
crete function increased confidence among potential users
that more complicated functions may be computed securely.
The user interface was designed in a manner that was fa-
miliar for participants, which also aided their ability to par-
ticipate. Although participants may not have initially been
familiar with the cryptographic techniques used, they were
familiar with the task of filling out cells in a spreadsheet. The
rest of the details of the protocol were abstracted away.
As our experimental results demonstrate, incorporating the
improvements identified via the heuristic evaluation reduced
the amount of human error during data entry. This shows that
deployments such as these may be well-served if they are exe-
cuted as joint collaboration between security engineers (who
can design a technically sound framework) and human factors
experts (who can improve UI/UX features before, during, and
after deployment). Such collaboration between application de-
velopers and human factors experts is particularly important
for privacy-preserving applications with which users have lim-
ited opportunities to interact: the applications must be usable
even when users encounter them for the first time.
Gathering user behavior data in privacy-preserving applica-
tions may leak information, or create side channels for identi-
fying or linking inputs to clients. However, MPC itself can be
used to gather these metrics while still maintaining the guar-
antee that individual inputs are not revealed. The results from
our usability study show that a variety of client-side metrics
can be collected at the aggregate level to guide future usabil-
ity improvements. This also demonstrates the relative ease
with which this can be done: no new cryptographic tools or
protocols (beyond those already necessary for the application)
were built for this usability study.
Data sanitization, error detection, and error recovery can-
not be achieved through manual inspection of secret-shared
input data, and one single erroneous input may corrupt the
entire result of an aggregate computation. Recovery from
such errors is difficult and at worst impossible: it may require
the execution of expensive MPC recovery protocols over the
secret-shared data. This is further complicated by the fact that
contributors must consent to the execution of such additional
protocols. Thus, it is important that extensive error checking
be performed on the client side within the application before
data sets are contributed. Even when the contributed data set
consists of analytics or usability metrics, such cleaning cannot
be done ad hoc after the computation and must be encoded
into the MPC protocol before deployment occurs.
The prohibitive cost of sanitizing the data after submission
also makes it critical that contributors can resubmit (or with-
draw) their data. In our last deployment, we received an email
from a participant inquiring if resubmission is possible, as
they had submitted random data to try the application out.
Without resubmission, the output would have been corrupted
in its entirety.
Finally, we have found that our experience echoes and con-
firms thoughts expressed by other researchers in the commu-
nity on the development of real-world MPC applications [53]:
“choose an application, starting from a very real business need,
and build the solution from the problem itself choosing the
right tools, tuning protocol ideas into a reasonable solution,
balancing security and privacy needs vs. other constraints:
legal, system setting, etc.”
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A Heuristic Evaluation
Two evaluators, both of whom were familiar with general hu-
man factors and usability principles, conducted the heuristic
evaluation. The evaluators were familiar with the web ap-
plication, but had not been involved in its development or
deployment. Each independently examined the web applica-
tion and listed general usability concerns. Next, they emulated
users and attempted to submit data. While emulating the user
tasks, they documented any issues they found. Then, they
independently categorized the issues into the ten heuristic
categories listed in Tables 4 and 5 [39, 40].
After each issue was placed into a category, each evalu-
ator gave each issue a severity rating according to the fre-
quency, impact, and persistence of the issue. The severity
ratings ranged from 1 to 5, with 1 representing the lowest
severity and 5 representing the highest severity. Next, the
evaluators compiled a list of potential solutions. Lastly, the
evaluators met with the web application designers to discuss
the feasibility of implementing the solutions.
B User Interface Redesign
The redesign divides the application into four distinct steps,
each visually and logically separated by a card layout. Cards
adhere to a pattern of help text, followed by a separator and
the action item. The first card contains three input elements:
session ID, participation ID, and spreadsheet (cf. Figure 7).
Both the session and participation ID are validated when
the user shifts the application focus from the input box. The
final input element, the spreadsheet, triggers a browser-based
parser for Excel files. This allows participants to simply drag-
and-drop the pre-filled template into the web application, and
reduce the possibility of copy/paste mistakes.
The second card contains the various tables for data entry,
as displayed in Figure 8. It shows only the help text by default.
To encourage participants to upload data rather than entering
it manually, the card only expands after the spreadsheet has
been provided. The tables were originally split by gender, and
contained entries for financial information, length of service,
and employee counts. User testing showed this caused confu-
sion, so our new interface reverses the grouping. This resolves
issues.
Validation of entries was enhanced for the 2017 collection.
First, “semantic validation” across tables was added: if the
employee count for a category in the first table is greater than
zero, we also expect a matching salary and length of service
greater than zero for that field in other tables. Clicking on
any red cells shows a pop-up describing the problem. This
resolves issues. The same validation is also present in the
Excel spreadsheet, so participants get the chance to address
any issues early on.
With the third card we introduce a new feature to collect
anonymous user feedback about the data collection process.
The responses will inform improvements for future data ses-
sions. Answering questions is mandatory in this iteration, and
unanswered questions turn red when attempting to submit.
The fourth and final card handles the actual data submis-
sion. In this card, shown in Figure 9, we show a summary
of the employee count entered, a list of all errors messages
that prevent a successful submission, and the history of both
successful and failed submissions. A pop-up appears on sub-
mission to highlight the submission outcome.
C Secure Aggregation Protocol
In this section, we describe in full our protocol for secure
aggregation within a finite additive group G such as Z/264Z.
Let Σ= (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme
that provides IND-CPA security; concretely, we use RSA in
our implementation [37]. We restrict our attention to the case
with a single analyst (as with the pay equity scenario). A
single execution or session of the protocol proceeds in the
following way:
Table 4: Listing of usability issues and average severity ratings categorized by heuristics 1 through 6; for the severity ratings, 1 is
the lowest severity and 5 is the highest severity. Issues not fixed in the redesign are marked.
# Usability Issue Avg. Fixed
1 Visibility of system status: the web application should always keep users informed, through appro-
priate feedback within reasonable time.
1.1 There is no indication as how much of the table has been or is yet to be completed. 4.5
1.2 There is no indication as to whether the session key is valid. 3.5
1.3 There is no indication as to whether the email address is valid. 1.5
1.4 After submission, user sees messages saying “loading” and then a confirmation window, which is confus-
ing.
3
1.5 After submission, there is no information indicating that data can be resubmitted. 3.5
1.6 There is no email confirmation indicating that data was submitted. 2
2 Match between system and the real world: the web application should speak the user’s language
and present information in a logical order.
2.1 The column and row headings do not use real-world terms that Human Resources (HR) uses, e.g., sum
instead of total, workforce instead of employees, and mos. instead of months.
4.5 No
2.2 The tables are separated by gender, irrespective of whether HR data is usually separate by gender, e.g., if
it is separated by ethnicity, it will be difficult for them to enter data separated by gender.
4.5 No
2.3 The table require a summation instead of an average, irrespective of whether HR data is given via averages
or summations.
4 No
2.4 The columns requiring summary data (i.e., sum) are visually the same and not separated from data on raw
numbers or monetary values.
2
2.5 The sum cells require one to calculate totals by hand. 3.5 No
2.6 When you drag to select the same value for multiple cells, the cells are highlighted in red, implying an
error.
3.5
3 User control and freedom: users will make mistakes and should be able to fix their errors easily.
The web application should support undo, redo, and process cancellation.
3.1 A cell is highlighted in red if a user clicks there, does not input a number, then clicks somewhere else. 5
3.2 Ctrl + Z (undo) is functional, but it always results in the previous cell being highlighted in red. 4
3.3 The meaning of the red cell is unclear. 5
3.4 Decimal points are not allowed in any cell. 4
4 Consistency and standards: users should not have to wonder whether different words, situations,
or actions mean the same thing. The web application should follow platform conventions.
4.1 The terms #, $, and mos. are used in the row headings, but not the column headings. 3.5 No
4.2 The difference between multiple employee groups is unclear, e.g., executive versus mid-level. 5 No
4.3 There is no option for “other” employee, i.e., if they don’t fall into one of the employee groups. 5 No
4.4 While there is an option for 2+ races, not including Hispanic/Latino, there is not an option for 2+ races,
including Hispanic/Latino.
5 No
4.5 Some employee types end with the word worker, but others do not. 2.5 No
5 Error prevention: Reduce errors by reconfirming actions before they are carried out.
No errors were detected.
6 The user should not have to remember information from one part of the dialogue to another. In-
structions for use of the web application should be visible or easily retrievable whenever appropri-
ate.
6.1 There is no objective or set of instructions indicating what and where information is to be entered as well
as where users can find the session key or appropriate email address.
5
6.2 There are no definitions of the terms, e.g., executive, mid-level, and annual compensation 5 No
Table 5: Listing of usability issues and average severity ratings categorized by heuristics 7 through 10; for the severity ratings, 1
is the lowest severity and 5 is the highest severity. Issues not fixed in the redesign are marked.
7 Flexibility and efficiency of use: The web application should cater to both inexperienced and expe-
rienced users, allow users to tailor frequent actions, and provide defaults.
7.1 Though copy and paste works, if an empty cell is copied, the pasted cell will be highlighted in red,
indicating that the copy and paste procedure did not work.
4 No
7.2 There is no way to enter functions into the cells, e.g., C2 = A2 + B2. 2
7.3 You can only drag cells to copy values either horizontally or vertically, not both. 2.5
8 Aesthetic and minimalist design: dialogues should not contain information which is irrelevant or
rarely needed.
8.1 Contrast between column and row fillings and text may be inadequate, i.e., black text on grey background
may not be visible for some users.
4
8.2 Red cells are inappropriate for those who are color blind, which is 8 percent of all males. 5
9 Help users recognize, diagnose, and recover from errors: error messages should be expressed in
plain language (no codes), precisely indicate the problem, and constructively suggest a solution.
9.1 There are no messages associated with the red cells. 5
9.2 There are no messages associated with the grey cells. 3.5
9.3 There is not a list of errors near the submit button that would indicate what needs to be fixed before
submission is possible.
4
10 Help documentation: Documentation should be easy to search, be focused on the user’s task, list
concrete steps to be carried out, and be minimalist.
10.1 There is no help page, documentation, or instructions. 5
1. The analyst initiates the process by generating a secret
and public RSA key pair (s, p) and a unique session
identifier id ∈ N, submitting p to the service provider,
and sending id to all the contributors;4
2. Each of the n contributors possesses a secret data value
di ∈ G and does the following at least once5:
(a) Generate a secret random mask mi ∈ G and calcu-
late the masked data ri = di +mi,
(b) Receive p from the service provider.
4The session identifier is only to allow distinct sessions, but it can serve
another purpose: if no malicious agent possesses the session identifier, any
data submitted by malicious agents will be ignored during the computation
of the result.
5Each contributor can perform step (2) as many times as they wish before
step (3) occurs; the operation they perform is idempotent if they always
submit the same data.
(c) Send ri and ci = Encp(mi) to the service provider.
3. The service provider computes the sum of the masked
data values to obtain the aggregate masked data quantity
R = ∑ni=1 ri;
4. The analyst then retrieves R and all the c1, . . . ,cn from
the service provider, computes mi = Decs(ci) for all i,
computes M = ∑ni=1 mi, and obtains the final result R−
M = ∑ni=1 di. No other party receives any output.
Figure 1 illustrates an example deployment of the protocol
with two contributors. Intuitively, this protocol is secure be-
cause the service provider’s view of the random masks is
protected using the analyst’s public key, and the analyst never
sees the individual masked data values unless it violates its
promise not to collude with the service provider.
Figure 4: The original contributor web interface used for the BWWC study at https://100talent.org as it appears within a
web browser with some user errors highlighted.
Figure 5: The original interface modified for the Pacesetters Initiative. This was used by Group 1 in the usability study.
Figure 6: Page for analyst to create cohorts, generation participation codes, and track anonymous submission history
Figure 7: First card of the 2017 interface. To encourage drag-and-drop upload from an Excel file, this is the only card shown by
default.
Figure 8: Submission card within the V2 interface. This example displays an empty cell and the corresponding tooltip.
Figure 9: Final card within the V2 at https://100talent.org. In this example, the verification check has failed. Text boxes
are still highlighted just as they were in the old interface (cf. Figure 4). Now, the full list of errors is co-located in this card.
